Monday, March 13, 2006

Exemplars

In this correlation, the identity or plurality of men doesn't matter. The first Kafka of "Betrachtung" is less a precursor of the Kafka of the gloomy myths and terrifying institutions than is Browning or Lord Dunsany.

J. L. Borges


"Science does not deal in all possible laboratory manipulations," Kuhn tells us (SSR, X, p. 126). "Instead, it selects those relevant to the juxtaposition of a paradigm with the immediate experience that that paradigm has partially determined." As an example, Kuhn offers Galileo's experiments with pendulums. His most controversial contention here, as he himself notes, is that Galileo was able to see a pendulum, where others--the Aristoteleans--simply were not. What they saw was the "constrained fall" of a stone on a string.

This difference can be understood in many ways that we have already looked at. In terms of symbolic generalisations, the Aristolean would describe the phenomenon by reference to "the weight of the stone, the vertical height to which it had been raised, and the time required for it to achieve rest," (p. 123) while Galileo "measured only weight, radius, angular displacement, and time per swing." In terms of models, Aristotle noted a "change of state rather than a process" and took the stone to be "impelled by its nature to reach its final resting point," i.e., the ground, (p. 122) while Galileo saw "the [pendulum's] motion as symmetrical and enduring; and . . . circular," its impetus deriving not from its tendency toward something, but rather from its distance from it," namely, the fixed point (p. 123-25). Finally, in terms of disciplinary values, Artistoteleans were likely to discuss these issues rather than observe actual pendulums. That is, Galileo valued empirical experiments, while Aristoteleans valued logical argument.

Our focus here is on exemplars. Kuhn emphasises that the paradigm that allowed Galileo's "individual genius" to see a pendulum where Aristotelean science could see only a constrained fall was not of his own making but was part of his scholastic heritage. Thus, Buridan's description of vibrating strings (p. 120) and especially Oresme's description of a swinging stone (which, Kuhn notes, "now appears as the first discussion of pendulums") are precursors of the paradigm shift marked by Galileo's studies. The "view of things" that Galileo had, was part of "the scholastic impetus paradigm for motion", a paradigm whose importance is of course very clear to us today.

The Argentinian writer, Jorge Luis Borges once pointed out that works of literature have a tendency to create their own precursors. Thus, with the work of Kafka, certain connections between hitherto unrelated authors begin to emerge. A tradition is formed that seemed to herald the work of Kafka, but from which we could not have predicted in any detail the character of Kafka's work. The same can be said of landmarks in the history of science. A great many developments within the scholastic tradition become apparent as a drive toward the discoveries of Galileo, allowing us to see pendulums where, in the past, Aristoteleans had been able to see only stones swinging on the end of strings.

In keeping with the spirit of Borges, it may be useful to point out that it is not the person of, say, Sir Isaac Newton, but some of his work that has come to be "paradigmatic" (in the sense of "exemplary") of modern science. Newton also dabbled in alchemy, though neither he nor his colleagues would have called it "dabbling" (they took it very seriously). His studies of planetary motion have served as examples for countless studies since then; his studies of how to turn lead into gold are examplary of quite another set of pursuits. Note also that examplars may be found from a time before a paradigm is fully formed, as the scholastic exemplars for Galileo's work shows.

While exemplars generally have an origin, or at least a set of early applications that have defined their content, it is important to keep in mind also that Kuhn means the actual operations that define the experiment or study, not the historical event of its early attempts. Thus, the pendulum along with a specific kind of analysis (one which in fact defines it as a pendulum) is an examplar of mechanics even today. It is the therefore not just the sort of thing you read about in history books, but the sort of thing you can have hands-on experience with.

Kuhn himself emphasises the importance of exemplars and devotes a good deal of space to them in his postscript (pp. 186-204). There is good reason to heed his emphasis here. One of the most useful ways of getting clear about the formative processes behind a field of research, including your own, is to make explicit what counts as "good work". It is one thing to explicate abstract criteria or norms (i.e., values) of good research; it is another to identify examples of work that meets them. It is also much easier to learn from concrete examples of quality research than to imagine a correspondence between ones own work and a set of formal rules. Good researchers should be aware of their precursors: they should be able to point out what the major successes in their field are.

When describing a disciplinary matrix in terms of its exemplars, the following information should be provided wherever possible. First, the name of the scientist who first carried out the exemplary study. Second, the date of the experiment. Third, the place it was first published, and the places the example may be found today (such as in textbooks). Fourth, a description of the experiment that emphasises the parts of the study that have contributed to forming the "immediate experience" of the paradigm. Paradigms will of course contain many exemplars of good research, so part of the task here is to identify those which are particularily influential.

In all cases, keep in mind that exemplar is always an instance of a successful pairing of problems that are recognized by the field and solutions that are valued by it. Identifying an examplar means identifying work that has been valuable to the formation of the researcher's competences and remains a benchmark in a significant way. This is why a field's progress "creates its own precursors", as Borges puts it. Progress may sometimes make previous exemplars less significant, and may indicate new examplars of what can be an older vintage.

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